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This paper shows that measurement invariance (defined in terms of an
invariant measurement model in different groups) is generally inconsistent
with selection invariance (defined in terms of equal sensitivity and specificity
across groups). In particular, when a unidimensional measurement instrument
is used, and group differences are present in the location but not in the
variance of the latent distribution, sensitivity and positive predictive value
will be higher in the group located at the higher end of the latent dimension,
whereas specificity and negative predictive value will be higher in the group
located at the lower end of the latent dimension. When latent variances are
unequal, the differences in these quantities depend on the size of group
differences in variances, relative to the size of group differences in means. The
effect is shown to originate as a special case of Simpson’s paradox, which
arises because the observed score distribution is collapsed into an
accept/reject dichotomy. Simulations show that the effect can be substantial
in realistic situations. It is suggested that the effect may be partly responsible
for overprediction in minority groups as typically found in empirical studies
on differential academic performance. A methodological solution to the
problem is suggested, and social policy implications are discussed.
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Measurement invariance versus selection
invariance:
Is fair selection possible?
The extent to which our society is dominated and structured by
psychometric selection processes can hardly be overestimated. College
admission tests are used to determine who is admitted to university education,
IQ-tests to choose between job applicants, and diagnostic tests to determine
what treatment one will receive upon experiencing psychological problems.
Such selection procedures affect people’s lives directly and profoundly. For
many people, psychometric testing procedures may be among the most
significant encounters with applied psychology that they will ever have.
Psychometric tests, however, are fallible instruments. Any decision
based on a psychometric test is the result of a probabilistic inference, which
implies that there always remains a chance that one has made the wrong
decision: John was admitted into college, while he does not have the capacity
to successfully complete his education, and Mary was diagnosed with an
attention deficit hyperactive disorder, while she did not actually suffer from
this condition. Because such incorrect decisions may have an adverse impact
on people’s lives, it is important to gauge the probabilities with which such
errors are made, and, if possible, to control them in such a way that every
tested person has a fair chance of a correct decision. Although it may be
impossible to avoid incorrect decisions completely, it is possible to construct
tests in such a fashion that they are as fair as possible, i.e., do not result in
discrimination against particular groups.
Of course, the basic idea in selection is that people with higher ability
levels should have higher chances of being selected for, say, college admission.
Therefore, to discriminate between people, in the sense of distinguishing
between their ability levels, is part and parcel of selection procedures.
Consequently, if people of higher ability levels are more often encountered in a
particular group, then more people from that group will be selected. Thus, if
a test does not result in the selection of equal proportions of individuals in
each group, that does not necessarily mean that something is wrong with the
test. However, the proportion of selected individuals should be the same in
subpopulations of people with equal ability, regardless of group membership:
if you and I have the same ability to complete a college degree, then we should
have the same probability of being admitted into college by a testing
procedure, irrespective of any other characteristics on which we may differ,
like sex, age, the color of our skin, or religious and political convictions.
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In the literature on psychometric testing, this requirement is called
measurement invariance. A test that fulfills the requirement of measurement
invariance measures the same attribute in the same way in different
subpopulations; hence, such testing procedures, although not infallible, can at
least be considered to bring an element of fairness to the measurement
procedure. Mathematically, the requirement of measurement invariance means
that the function that relates psychological abilities to test scores should be
invariant over groups (Mellenbergh, 1989; Meredith, 1993). In the past
decades, several methods that allow for the detection of violation of this
requirement have been developed (e.g., see Holland & Wainer, 1993; Millsap &
Everson, 1993), and these methods are now commonly used in large testing
programs. For instance, measurement invariance is routinely investigated by
the Educational Testing Service, which is responsible for the widely used SAT.
It is widely believed, both in psychometric circles and beyond, that if
measurement invariant tests are used, then selection processes are fair to
different groups of people; in fact, as indicated above, this is one of the main
motivations for their development. However, it is questionable whether this
belief is correct. In a truly fair selection procedure, one would expect not only
that people with the same ability have the same chance of being selected,
regardless of their group membership, but also that the selection procedure
works equally well for each group, so that the test’s efficiency (in terms of
sensitivity and specificity) is invariant. Call this property selection invariance.
Intuitively, one may expect that measurement invariance and selection
invariance can coexist; several colleagues whom we probed for their intuition
on this point in fact thought that the former implies the latter. This is
because measurement invariance ensures that, in every subpopulation of
people with equal ability, the proportion of incorrect decisions will be identical
across groups, so that in these subpopulations selection invariance holds.
Hence, one may expect that selection invariance also holds for the proportion
of incorrect decisions in the intact populations, because these can be
conceptualized as the union of the subpopulations in question. Also, Millsap
and Kwok (2004) evaluated the effect of violations of measurement invariance
for differential test efficiency across groups, and found that the more
measurement invariance was violated, the greater were the differences in test
efficiency. On the basis of these findings, one might be tempted to conclude
that in the situation where measurement invariance does hold, no differences
in test efficiency would occur.
This intuition, however, is incorrect. The present paper shows that, for
very general class of situations in which latent differences between groups
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exist, the properties of measurement invariance and selection invariance are
inconsistent. This somewhat counterintuitive result arises as a special case of
Simpson’s (1951) paradox. Measurement invariance is a property that applies
to the expected test score for individuals of equal ability, while test efficiency
is a property that applies to subpopulations that are aggregated over ability
levels. In the process of aggregation, the independence of group membership
and the probability of passing the test is destroyed, which in turn causes
violations of selection invariance. On the other hand, if selection invariance is
satisfied, the selection procedure must assign different odds of being selected
to people with the same ability, but different group membership, in which case
the test cannot be measurement invariant.
In sum, in many cases in which groups differ in measured ability, a test
cannot exhibit both measurement invariance and selection invariance. The
implications of this situation are serious, and will be discussed below. First,
we discuss the relation between measurement invariance and selection
invariance in greater detail. Because we focus on the situation in which
measurement invariance holds, the present paper can be viewed as a
companion paper to Millsap and Kwok (2004), who investigated essentially
the same situation for the case in which measurement invariance is violated.
Measurement invariance and selection invariance
The basic idea of psychometric selection is to identify suitable
candidates on the basis of a test score. We will assume that the suitability of
an individual depends on a single continuous latent variable θ. Define a
suitable candidate as an individual i with θi ≥ θc, where θc is the latent cutoff
that separates individuals who one wants to reject from those one wants to
select. Because the ability θ is not directly observable, people are selected on
the basis of a test score that is viewed as an observable indicator of θ; denote
this test score X. We will assume that the latent variable is distributed
according to the normal probability density function, denoted f(.), with mean
µg and standard deviation σg in group G = g, so that
p(θ) = fµg ,σg(θ). (1)
Further, we assume that the test scores X are linearly related to the abilities θ
according to the regression line E(X|θ) = agθ, where ag > 0 is the regression
coefficient for group g and  denotes the residual or error score:
X = agθ + . (2)
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Finally, we assume that the errors  are normally distributed with variance σ2
constant across levels of θ (i.e., homoscedasticity).
These assumptions are consistent with the single factor model for
continuous item responses (Mellenbergh, 1994); they will also approximate the
common situation in which people are selected on the basis of a total test
score composed of dichotomous items, which are considered to measure a
single dominant continuous latent variable, provided that the number of items
is reasonably large so that the relation between the total score and the latent
variable is approximately linear.
Given these assumptions, the test score of an individual in group g with
a certain true ability θ is a random draw from the probability density function:
p(X|θ) = fagθ,σg (X). (3)
The selection procedure operates on the bivariate distribution of X and θ,
which for a single group is graphically represented in Figure 1. The objective
of a selection procedure is to select those individuals whose ability θ exceeds
the threshold θ = θc; in this paper we use the convention that θc = 0.
Individuals whose ability exceeds this threshold are called suitable, denoted S,
others are unsuitable, ¬S. A standard selection procedure based on an ability
test selects those individuals whose test score exceeds a certain threshold
value Xc. Throughout this paper we adopt the convention that Xc = 0.
Individuals whose test score exceeds this value and pass the test are accepted,
denoted A, others are rejected, ¬A.
In any selection procedure, it may happen that an individual who is not
suitable, having θ < 0, passes the test by sheer luck, X ≥ 0. In that case, the
individual is accepted yet unsuitable: A ∩ ¬S. Similarly, an individual who is
suitable, θ ≥ 0, due to whatever circumstance, may not pass the test, X < 0.
The individual is then suitable yet rejected: S ∩ ¬A. The four quadrants in
Figure 1 are thus occupied by four combinations of suitable and unsuitable
accepted and rejected individuals (true positives, false positives, true
negatives, and false negatives). The efficiency of a selection procedure is
determined by the distribution of individuals over these quadrants; obviously,
one desires as many people as possible in the true positive and true negative
quadrants.
Insert Figure 1 about here
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The two group scenario
The primary focus of this paper is on a situation that involves the
selection of individuals from two groups that differ in the distribution of the
latent variable. This is the same scenario as that considered by Millsap and
Kwok (2004). In this section we consider the situation in which the variance
of the latent distributions are equal but the means differ. The assumption of
equal variances will be relaxed later in this paper.
Denote the group with the higher mean as H and the group with the
lower mean as L. In the context of fair selection, it is generally deemed
important that, regardless of groups differences in the distribution of θ, the
relation between the test scores and the latent variable be invariant across
groups. If this is not the case, then individuals from different groups, who
have the same position on θ, have different expected test scores. This should
be considered unfair, because it implies that, given a specific level of ability,
group membership still influences the selection procedure. The requirement
that the relation between observed scores and latent ability is invariant across
groups is known as measurement invariance. Formally, measurement
invariance is satisfied if and only if, conditional on θ, the probability
distribution or density of the observed scores does not depend on group
membership. Thus, measurement invariance is defined by the restriction
p(X|θ) = p(X|θ ∩ g). (4)
This requirement is identical to the conditions formulated by Mellenbergh
(1989) and Meredith (1993). Further, given the fact that the probability
function p has been assumed to be linear and the population distributions
normal, the requirement of measurement invariance (4) comes down to the
equality of both ag and σg across the levels of the grouping variable G. If
these requirements are satisfied, then the selection situation for a two group
scenario may be depicted as in Figure 2: the bivariate distributions of X and
θ lie on the same regression line.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Measurement invariance implies that the distribution of the test score,
conditional on a given value of the latent variable, is invariant across groups.
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This, in turn, means that the probability of being accepted, determined by
passing the test, does not vary among members of the different groups G
conditional on their level of ability:
p(A|θ) = p(A|θ ∩ g). (5)
Equation (5) implies that, for every level of ability, the false positive and false
negative rates are exactly the same in both groups (see Appendix A for a
proof). For this reason, it is tempting to think that measurement invariance
entails equal sensitivity and specificity in each group. The next section shows
that this is incorrect.
Measurement invariance and selection invariance
It would seem that a fair selection procedure should be characterized by
an identical number of selection errors across groups; that is, it should
distribute its errors evenly. This requirement implies that the test’s positive
predictive value (the probability of suitability, given acceptance), negative
predictive value (the probability of non-suitablity, given rejection), sensitivity
(the probability of acceptance, given suitability) and specifity (the probability
of rejection, given non-suitability) be equal across groups. If these
probabilities are equal across groups, then the test works equally well in each
group; i.e., it has the same efficiency. This is what we call selection
invariance. Formally, it is expressed by the following equalities:
Invariant Positive Predictive Value p(S|A ∩ g) = p(S|A), (6)
Invariant Negative Predictive Value p(¬S|¬A ∩ g) = p(¬S|¬A), (7)
Invariant Sensitivity p(A|S ∩ g) = p(A|S), (8)
Invariant Specificity p(¬A|¬S ∩ g) = p(¬A|¬S). (9)
Analogous to the terminology of the theory of measurement invariance, we
define selection bias as the violation of one or more of these equalities.
To see that measurement invariance and selection invariance are
mutually inconsistent properties in case the locations of the latent
distributions differ, first consider the positive predictive value, i.e., the
probability of suitability given acceptance, as represented in Equation (6). As
a function of the continuous distributions assumed for the test scores and the
ability, the relevant expression for the probability in question is:
p(S|A ∩ g) = p(S ∩A|g)
p(A|g) =
p(θ ≥ 0 and X ≥ 0|g)
p(X ≥ 0|g) . (10)
Both the numerator and the denominator in this equation are integral
expressions involving both the distribution of group g over the ability
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parameter θ and the distributions over test scores given an ability. These
integrals cannot be solved analytically. However, it can be shown that their
quotient is a monotonically increasing function of µg, the mean of the
distribution of group g over the ability: the higher the mean of the group’s
distribution function over θ, the higher the probability of suitability given
acceptance. For two groups H and L we therefore obtain:
µH > µL ⇒ p(S|A ∩H) > p(S|A ∩ L). (11)
The details of the proof are in Appendix A. This shows that, if measurement
invariance holds, then the positive predictive value necessarily varies over the
groups considered: in the group with higher mean ability, the positive
predictive value will be higher than in the group with lower mean ability.1
We may wonder whether a similar result holds for test sensitivity, i.e.,
the probability of acceptance given suitability:
p(A|S ∩ g) = p(S ∩A|g)
p(S|g) =
p(θ ≥ 0 and X ≥ 0|g)
p(θ ≥ 0|g) . (12)
This is indeed so, as can be derived in roughly the same way. We have already
established that p(S|A ∩ g) gets larger with larger µg. Therefore, to establish
that p(A|S ∩ g) gets larger with larger µg, it suffices to show that the problem
discussed above is symmetric with respect to interchanging the variables X
and θ.
There is an intuitive argument for the symmetry of the selection
problem. First, the linear dependence of the test scores on ability entails a
linear dependence of ability on test scores, with a regression line E(θ|X) = Xa




(θ). Second, given the linear
dependence of test scores on ability, the normal distribution of the group over
the ability parameter, fµg ,σ(θ), translates into a normal distribution over the
test scores, fmg ,s(X) with mean mg = aµg and standard deviation
s = f(σ, σ, a), a function independent of µg. This means that we can derive
the same probabilistic inequalities after interchanging the variables X and θ.
A more detailed argument for both these claims is given in Appendix B.
Thus, with respect to the probability of acceptance given suitability, the
same relation holds as was established for the probability of suitability given
acceptance. Namely:
µH > µL ⇒ p(A|S ∩H) > p(A|S ∩ L). (13)
The sensitivity of the testing procedure will be better for the group with
higher mean ability. The inverse results hold for negative predictive value and
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specificity because they are the mirror images of positive predictive value and
sensitivity. Hence, we further have:
µH > µL ⇒ p(¬S|¬A ∩H) < p(¬S|¬A ∩ L), (14)
and
µH > µL ⇒ p(¬A|¬S ∩H) < p(¬A|¬S ∩ L). (15)
This shows that, in a selection procedure that conforms to the present
assumptions of a) multivariate normality, b) equal variances of the ability
distributions across groups, and c) measurement invariance, we get the
following result: In the group with higher mean ability, the procedure will
have a higher sensitivity and positive predictive value, while in the group with
lower mean ability, it will have a higher specificity and negative predictive
value. Under the assumptions stated, it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy
measurement invariance and selection invariance.
Generalization of the impossibility result
In real world situations, groups may differ both in mean ability and in
variance. However, the foregoing was based on the assumption that the
variances of the latent variable distributions are equal across groups. We now
relax this assumption. A direct consequence of doing this is that the
impossibility result may no longer hold in all situations; whether simultaneous
satisfaction of measurement and selection invariance is possible depends on
how the means and variances differ over groups. In this section, we investigate
how the relation between measurement invariance and selection invariance
behaves as a function of these differences.
The strategy we use to deal with the situation in which groups differ in
both means and variances is the following. We apply a transformation to the
latent variable distribution in one group in order to remove the difference in
variances. This causes the variance of the latent variable distribution to be
the same across groups, but alters the mean and regression coefficient in the
transformed group. We then scale the regression coefficient back to its original
value. This gives a counterfactual situation, in which both the variances and
the regression parameter are the same in both groups. We then use the results
derived in the previous section to evaluate whether, in that counterfactual
situation, a difference in, say, sensitivity exists.
If so, we consider the direction of the effect of the employed
transformations on sensitivity to evaluate whether we can generalize the
conclusion from the transformed case to the untransformed case. For instance,
if we know that the set of transformations made sensitivity smaller than it
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originally was, while in the resulting situation sensitivity was still larger in the
transformed group when compared to the untransformed group, then
sensitivity must also have been greater in that group before the
transformation started. Finally, we derive a set of conditions under which this
situation obtains; i.e., the set of conditions that describes the class of
situations in which measurement invariance and selection invariance are
provably inconsistent.
We first concentrate on sensitivity and positive predictive value, as
expressed in equations (10) and (12). We make the following two observations
concerning these probabilities. First, they are invariant under the combined
scale transformations of the ability parameter and the regression coefficient,




for α ∈ (0,∞). Second, considering the transformation (17) while all else is
kept fixed, both sensitivity and positive predictive value get larger for larger
regression coefficients a. Both observations are proved in Appendix C.
We can write down the observations more formally as follows. Consider
a group g with a density fµ,σ(θ), and denote this group with gµ,σ. Further
consider a test characterized by faθ,σ(X) and denote the corresponding
probability assignment over X and θ by pa,σ , or pa for short. The first
observation then comes down to the following statements:
pa(S|A ∩ gµ,σ) = p a
α
(S|A ∩ gαµ,ασ),




The second observation comes down to the following two statements:
α < 1 ⇒
 p aα (S|A ∩ gµ,σ) > pa(S|A ∩ gµ,σ),p a
α
(A|S ∩ gµ,σ) > pa(A|S ∩ gµ,σ).
(19)
Both these pairs of observations are used in the proof concerning two groups
with differing means and variances.
Consider the selection problem for two groups, gµ,σ and gµ′,σ′ with
σ 6= σ′, and a test characterized by a regression coefficient a and an error
variance σ. We assume nothing on the order of µ and µ′, and we hold on to
measurement invariance, so that a and σ are the same for both groups. We
further assume σ > σ′ without loss of generality. We may then employ the
above observations to derive more general inequalities for the probabilities
involved in selection invariance.
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The first observation allows us to transform the standard deviation in
one group so that it equals the standard deviation in the other group. For this
purpose we use the combined transformations (16) and (17) with α = σ
′
σ so
that α < 1. We choose to transform in the group with the larger standard









We now compare these probabilities to a situation where the standard
deviations and means have been transformed as above, but the regression
parameter equals its original value. From Equation (19) we may then derive
the conditional inequalities
α < 1 ⇒
 p aα (S|A ∩ gαµ,σ′) > pa(S|A ∩ gαµ,σ′),p a
α
(A|S ∩ gαµ,σ′) > pa(A|S ∩ gαµ,σ′).
(21)
Recall that σ′ = ασ. Therefore the expressions on the right side of Equation
(20) are identical to the expressions on the left side of Equation (21).
Because of the employed transformations, the expressions on the right
side of Equation (21) have variance σ′ and regression parameter a, allowing us
to compare the expressions to those for the untransformed group gµ′,σ′ .
Specifically, we can apply the results of the previous section concerning
acceptance and suitability as follows:
αµ > µ′ ⇒
 pa(S|A ∩ gαµ,σ′) > pa(S|A ∩ gµ′,σ′),pa(A|S ∩ gαµ,σ′) > pa(A|S ∩ gµ′,σ′). (22)
These are just conditions (11) and (13), used here to compare the transformed
situation in one group with the untransformed situation in the other group.
Clearly, if αµ = µ′, the two terms in the above are equal.
The joint effect of transformations (20) and (21) is a decrease of
sensitivity and positive predictive value, as can be seen from the inequalities
in (21). Thus, if the inequalities in Equation (22) hold, which will be the case
under the condition αµ > µ′, the inequalities must hold for the original,
untransformed case as well. With regard to sensitivity, for example, we have
established that, under the conditions stated, pa(A|S ∩ gµ,σ) =
p a
α
(A|S ∩ gαµ,σ′) > pa(A|S ∩ gαµ,σ′) ≥ pa(A|S ∩ gµ′,σ′). Hence it follows that
pa(A|S ∩ gµ,σ) > pa(A|S ∩ gµ′,σ′), which is the inconsistency between
measurement invariance and selection invariance with regard to sensitivity.
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To establish the reach of these results, we may now concatenate
Equations (20) to (22) and collect the conditions. We then obtain





 pa(S|A ∩ gµ,σ) > pa(S|A ∩ gµ′,σ′),pa(A|S ∩ gµ,σ) > pa(A|S ∩ gµ′,σ′). (23)
Furthermore, by inverting the above reasoning we can also prove that





 pa(¬S|¬A ∩ gµ,σ) < pa(¬S|¬A ∩ gµ′,σ′),pa(¬A|¬S ∩ gµ,σ) < pa(¬A|¬S ∩ gµ′,σ′). (24)
For this we employ the Equations (20) to (22), but we transform θ → −θ.
These results widen the scope of the inequalities derived in the previous
section; if we choose σ = σ′, we obtain the original inequalities. Equation (23)
says that, if the transformation of the latent variable leads to a scenario in
which the transformed mean lies above the mean of the other group, then
sensitivity and positive predictive value will be larger in the group with the
larger variance.2 Equation (24) implies that, if the transformed mean lies
below the mean of the other group, then specificity and negative predictive
value will be larger in the group with the smaller variance. Thus we can either
prove the inequality of sensitivity and positive predictive value, or the
inequality of specificity and negative predictive value.
This means that measurement invariance and selection invariance are
inconsistent in all situations, because at least one of the pairs of sensitivity
and specificity or positive and negative predictive value will not be invariant.
Note that this does not mean that for any combination of values of σ
′
σ , µ and
µ′, only one of the two invariances will be violated. Our conditions are
sufficient for proving the inequalities at issue, but not necessary for the
inequalities themselves, so the failure of a condition does not entail the failure
of the inequalities. If for example α 1 while αµ < µ′, the inequalities for
sensitivity and positive predictive value still hold. More generally, we
conjecture that both the invariance of sensitivity and specificity and the
invariance of positive and negative predictive value are violated almost
everywhere in the space σ
′
σ × µ× µ′, except for on two planes where only one
of the two invariances holds. These planes intersect along the line where
σ′
σ = 1 and µ = µ
′, that is, the situation where the latent distributions of the
groups are identical. Unfortunately we do not have a proof of this conjecture.
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However, for present purposes it is enough that we have proved that selection
invariance, in the general sense, will be violated if measurement invariance is
satisfied.
Explaining the paradox
We have shown that, under a wide range of conditions, the satisfaction
of measurement invariance entails the violation of selection invariance. The
paradoxical nature of this result can be clearly seen when one compares
Equation (5) to Equation (13): Although it is true that, for any two
subpopulations in H and L with equal θ, the probability of passing the test
given their level of ability is identical (measurement invariance), for the intact
populations H and L, which are the unions of these subpopulations, the
probability of passing the test, given suitability, is different (selection bias).
This section aims to offer a conceptual explanation of the mechanism that
produces these inconsistencies.
First, consider test sensitivity. The discrepancy in test sensitivity can be
understood as the result of a continuous version of Simpson’s paradox
(Simpson, 1951; Wainer & Brown, 2004; Yule, 1903). Simpson’s paradox
describes how effects that are observed in subpopulations can differ
dramatically from effects observed in the aggregate of the subpopulations. In
the present case, we have independence of acceptance and group membership
in all subpopulations with equal θ, but aggregating over different values of θ
destroys this independence. This happens as follows. Note that most incorrect
selection decisions would occur around the cutoff score X = 0. The Gaussian
on the left side of Figure 3 shows the probability of a false rejection for a
point of θ which is associated with an expected test score slightly above the
cutoff. As can be seen, this chance is considerable, although it will always be
less than .50 for values of θ > 0. The point is that, with increasing ability, the
chance of such an error becomes increasingly small. This can be seen from the
Gaussian on the right.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Now, the reason for the existence of group differences in sensitivity lies
in the fact that, in the population of suitable candidates (i.e., candidates with
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θ > 0), there are proportionally more suitable members from population L
than there are members from population H in the direct neighborhood of the
cutoff score: The group of suitable members from L is distributed more
towards the left of the figure than the group of suitable members from H. A
different way of viewing this is by noting that, among suitable candidates,
there are proportionally more members from H than members from L among
those far above the cutoff.3 As a result, incorrect rejections will occur more
frequently in the subpopulation of suitable members from L, which lowers
sensitivity in that population. The same argument, but now considered for
the subpopulation of unsuitable candidates (i.e., candidates with θ ≤ 0)
explains why specificity will be higher among members of L: there will be
proportionally fewer members of L than members of H in the neighborhood of
the cutoff score. Since the probability of the relevant false decision (i.e.,
incorrect acceptance) is highest for those who score in the neighborhood of
X = 0, and there are proportionally more such candidates among unsuitable
members of H, specificity will be lower for population H.
To understand why groups differ in positive predictive value, i.e., in the
probability of suitability given acceptance, it is instructive to focus on the
regression of θ on X (see also Appendix B, which formalizes this point). The
following counterintuitive fact now emerges: whereas the regression of test
scores on latent trait scores is identical across groups (i.e., measurement
invariance), the regression of latent trait scores on test scores is not. The
regression of trait scores on test scores is not group-invariant because (due to
mean group differences in ability) the intercept in the regression of the low
scoring group will be lower. Thus, although the expected value of X given θ is
the same for members of different groups, the expected value of θ given a
particular test score X is lower for those in the low-scoring group. This
counterintuitive effect was dubbed Kelley’s paradox by Wainer (2000, 2005),
because the effect follows from Kelley’s (1927) classic formula for estimating
ability scores from test scores. In Kelley’s formula trait score estimation is a
function of the test score and the mean ability score of the particular group,
which is weighted by the test’s unreliability. The effect is due to variance in
the test scores that is unrelated to the latent trait (i.e., residual variance) and
does not occur for the special case that θ and X are perfectly correlated.
However, in case of a less-than-perfect relation between test scores and the
latent trait scores, group differences in mean latent ability are necessarily
underestimated by the mean differences in test score. This effect ‘penalizes’
members of population L when ability is regressed on test scores.
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The key concept here is differential regression to the mean: the effect of
regression to the mean will be stronger for population L, because in that
group selection has occurred proportionally more often on high scores that are
not due to high ability (i.e., ‘measurement errors’); this, in turn, is a direct
consequence of the situation that leads to Simpson’s paradox as discussed
above.
Seriousness of violations of selection invariance
We have shown that selection invariance and measurement invariance
are inconsistent for almost all situations, and have explained the mechanism
that produces these inconsistencies. We now address the question how large
these effects are for realistic selection scenarios.
The seriousness of violations of selection invariance, given measurement
invariance, depends on the percentage of variance in test scores unrelated to
the trait (i.e., unreliability), the value of the selection ratio, and the size of
group differences in mean latent ability. To examine the seriousness of
violations of selection invariance, we simulated data for a two-group scenario
with a one standard deviation difference in mean latent ability between groups
and equal group size. We varied the selection ratio as the top 5%, top 10%,
top 25% and top 50% (these percentages apply to the combined population).
For each of these scenarios we examine the between-group differences in
sensitivity, positive predictive value, specificity, and negative predictive value
as a function of reliability. Reliability was defined as the ratio of true score
variance to total variance (Lord & Novick, 1968); we varied this parameter by
adding different amounts of white noise to the test scores, corresponding to
different values of σ in Equation (3). Correct acceptance was defined as
acceptance of a candidate, given that the candidate occupies a position in the
top s percent of the combined latent distribution, where s equals the selection
ratio for the relevant scenario; the other relevant probabilities were computed
analogously. The results of the simulations are graphically depicted in Figures
4 and 5.
Insert Figure 4 about here
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Insert Figure 5 about here
The simulations show that, for the chosen parameter settings, the
amount of selection bias implied by measurement invariance can be
substantial. Differences in sensitivity are consistently between 5 and 10%; and
when less reliable tests are used for selection, differences in positive predictive
value may be as large as 20%. The differences for specificity and negative
predictive value are less pronounced, and become serious only for less extreme
selection ratios. As is to be expected from the theoretical work above, for all
levels of reliability below 1.0, the probability of false positives is lower for the
group with higher mean ability, while the converse is true for the probability
of false negatives. In the right panel of Figure 4, it can further be seen that
the differences in test sensitivity are relatively stable across different levels of
reliability, while the differences in positive predictive value increase rapidly as
reliability drops. This differential effect of reliability originates as follows.
Because the difference between groups in test sensitivity depends only on the
distribution of θ, the difference remains constant over all reliability ranges
(after an initial divergence from the point of perfect reliability). On the other
hand, the effect of differential regression towards the mean, which causes the
difference in positive predictive value, increases in severity when reliability
decreases and when selection becomes more extreme. This explains why the
difference in positive predictive value increases for lower reliability as well as
for more extreme selection ratios.
When compared with the results for sensitivity, differences in specificity
depend on the extremity of the selection ratio in the opposite way: the
difference in the correct rejection rates becomes larger as the selection ratio
becomes less extreme. This is because, as the selection ratio becomes less
extreme, the cutoff score becomes lower. As a result, the cutoff score moves
into the lower tail of the distribution of population with higher mean ability;
hence there are proportionally more unsuitable members of that population
directly below the latent cutoff score, and incorrect acceptance occurs
proportionally more often. In accordance, differences in negative predictive
value become larger as the selection ratio becomes less extreme. Like the
positive predictive value, the negative predictive value is sensitive to reliability




The theoretical work reported in this paper has shown that, if latent
differences between groups exist and measurement invariant tests are used,
selection procedures will produce different rates of incorrect decisions in these
groups. Hence, with the exclusion of cases, in which latent population
differences are absent, measurement invariance and selection invariance are
mutually inconsistent. Further, the reported simulation results suggest that
the use of measurement invariant tests for selection purposes leads to
considerable violations of selection invariance. The results of this paper
therefore do not concern a mere statistical curiosity, but imply the presence of
a potentially serious problem in selection situations. We now turn to some
empirical, methodological, and social policy implications of this problem.
Empirical implications: Overprediction
The empirical situation implied by the present work is that, in a group
with higher mean ability, there will be more people who should have been
accepted but were not; and in a group with lower mean ability, there will be
more people who were accepted while they should not have been. There are
reasons to suspect that such a situation does, in fact, obtain in our society. In
educational selection situations, minority groups are often observed to achieve
lower scores on the tests that are used for selection, which, if measurement
invariance holds, may be due to differences in the location of the ability
distributions between these groups. On purely statistical grounds, we would
then expect higher drop-out rates among selected members from minority
groups. Such increased drop-out rates have indeed been observed. In
differential prediction studies, criterion performance (e.g., study success as
reflected in freshmen GPA) is often regressed on ability test scores. The
typical result in these studies is that the regression line of low-scoring minority
groups is lower than the regression line of majority groups, indicating that the
former group has lower criterion scores than would be expected from their test
scores (Neisser et al., 1996; Sackett & Wilk, 1994; Willingham, Pollack, &
Lewis, 2002). This so-called ‘overprediction effect’ could be accounted for by
differential regression towards the mean as discussed above (see also Linn &
Werts, 1971; Millsap, 1997, 1998; Reilly, 1973).
Of course, there may be many other causes of increased drop-out rates
among minority groups (e.g., stereotype threat; Steele, 1997). For one thing,
the assumption of a latent difference, which drives the statistical mechanism
discussed here, may be false in real selection situations; overprediction may, in
such cases, be caused by different factors. However, it is important that, in
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the interpretation of research findings, the effects of this purely statistical
mechanism are also recognized. One reason for this is that, regardless of other
explanations of the overprediction phenomenon, if there exist latent
differences between groups, we can be certain that differential regression to
the mean actually occurs.
The size of this effect depends for a large part on the reliability of the
scores that are yielded by the measurement instrument used for selection.
Now, while inspecting the simulations reported here, one may feel that with
respect to, say, college admissions in the U.S., the problem cannot be very
large; for the reliability of (subtest) scores on selection instruments like the
SAT is considerable in the general population (typically over .80, often over
.90). However, it should be noted that reliability is a population dependent
concept (Mellenbergh, 1996) that is sensitive to restriction of range as it
occurs in subpopulations with comparable abilities (as an illustration, in the
limiting case of a subpopulation of people with equal ability reliability equals
zero by definition; e.g., see Borsboom, 2005). Since the SAT admittance
policies for U.S. universities are known to the public, a significant degree of
self-selection occurs prior to the formal selection process as carried out by
universities (see Linn, 1983, for some illustrative empirical examples of the
effects of self-selection). This suggests that the reliability of the SAT score
within populations that apply to the same university may be considerably
lower than the reliability of the SAT scores in the general population; and of
course it is the reliability in the self-selected applicant populations, not the
reliability in the general population, that drives the mechanisms discussed in
the present paper. Thus, it would be unwise to dismiss the mechanism
discussed above purely on the basis of reliability estimates that apply to the
general population. In any practical situation, evaluation of whether the
problem actually occurs requires the inspection of reliability estimates as they
apply to the subpopulation that will actually be subjected to the selection
procedure in question. These figures are likely to differ substantially over
different universities and campuses, depending on how serious the restriction
of range induced by self-selection is.
Social policy implications: Fairness
The present paper is largely based on the juxtaposition of two intuitions
that most people have with respect to fairness in selection. On the one hand,
we want selection procedures to be fair to individuals. The conditions that
best protect such fairness are provided through the requirement of
measurement invariance, because measurement invariance operates conditional
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on levels of ability. On the other hand, we want selection procedures to be fair
to groups. This condition applies to aggregate populations and therefore is
best guaranteed by selection invariance. The present paper elaborates on the
conflicting implications of these requirements. While we think that this
elucidates the workings of selection procedures with respect to different
selection scenarios, it also presents us with a significant problem. How should
we deal with this situation? What are the implications for social policy?
One problem that immediately presents itself is the following. A direct
implication that follows from the difference in positive predictive value across
groups, is that in the estimation of trait scores prior information on group
membership increases the precision of the estimates. This raises the question
of whether one should use this information in selection. The argument for
doing this is that it results in a more accurate selection procedure, and on this
basis some have indeed argued for incorporating information on group
membership in selection procedures (e.g., Miller, 1994). The argument against
such practice is that it implies the use of different cutoff scores in different
groups, which is commonly viewed as unfair and discriminatory. Howard
Wainer (personal communication, October 28, 2005) articulated the case
against using prior information on group membership in selection forcefully,
by drawing attention to the distinction between the use of tests as
measurement instruments, and the use of tests as contests:
‘I think a key issue in this is the use of the group membership
information. If it is for diagnosis (e.g. educational diagnosis—what
is the best course of study for a particular child; medical
diagnosis—what disease do you have) using prior information is
fine—and maybe even imperative. This is the so-called testing for
the purpose of measurement. But for selection (testing as contest)
it is not o.k. If you and I get the same score on a selection test it
is not proper to take me over you because my mother might have
had more education. Measurements must be as accurate as
possible. Contests must be as fair as possible. So using priors is
fine for measurement, but not for contests. [This is] subtle
perhaps, but critically important.’
We are of the opinion that the ethical implications of using prior information
on group membership in selection outweigh the technical benefits of increased
precision, and hence tend to agree with Wainer on ideological grounds. We
should, however, be very careful in evaluating the effects of any given policy in
selection, even when ethically it is prima facie beyond contention. Even when
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we agree that tests, as contests, should be a fair as possible to individuals, and
accordingly hold on to the requirement of measurement invariance, the
implication is that the sensitivity and positive predictive value will differ over
populations. This may have negative consequences in itself.
For instance, consider again the scenario as it may occur in selection
situations that involve minority groups. As explained in the previous
paragraph, there are empirical reasons to consider the possibility that accepted
members from some minority groups may include a larger number of false
positives, which may be partly responsible for the observed increased dropout
rates among members of such groups. The presence of more false positives
among minorities may create a perceived empirical basis for prejudice.
Suppose that people notice that, among minority groups that (for
whatever reason) have a lower position on the dimensions that determine
academic performance, there are more candidates who were incorrectly
accepted. Such a perception may promote and sustain negative attitudes
towards minorities. This, in turn, may affect the performance of minority
groups adversely, so that the improvement of the social status of these groups
is hampered. Because such a result may itself have a negative effect on the
determinants of academic performance of new generations of minorities, a
vicious circle of reciprocal negative effects looms. Even when our intentions
are good, our actions may have adverse consequences.
Thus, even when we choose to treat tests as contests, and focus on
measurement invariance as the preferred conceptualization of fairness in
selection, the violation of selection invariance that is entailed by this decision
may have negative consequences in itself. Our ideological inclinations simply
will not make such problems go away. Therefore it would seem best to have a
methodological procedure that minimizes the violations of selection
invariance, conditional on measurement invariance. The next section evaluates
a number of possible methodological solutions that could be considered.
Methodological implications: Can the problem be solved?
The effects on selection invariance that are discussed in this paper can,
in general, be countered by using more reliable test scores. In particular, we
can design tests in which the variance of the errors around the regression line
is made smaller. Three methodological procedures can be followed to achieve
this. First, one could try to improve test reliability across the board; i.e., for
all populations involved in selection. Second, one could try to improve test
reliability selectively, for instance in the group with lower mean ability. Third,
one could try to improve test reliability locally, by improving reliability in the
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region of the latent ability θ that is most influential in producing selection
bias.
It is well known that reliability increases with test length. The first
option could therefore be realized by creating longer tests. This option,
however, is often not viable. Test constructors are already doing all they can
to make test scores as reliable as possible, and moreover are faced with
practical and financial limitations to test length. In addition, increasing
reliability across the board is inefficient; especially at the extremes of the
latent dimension, it is not necessary since the persons located there do not
play a significant role in producing differences in test efficiency. Moreover, as
indicated above, it is the reliability of test scores within applicant populations,
not the general population, that drives the violation of selection invariance;
and since applicant subpopulations will typically be self-selected, and hence
more homogenous in ability level, adding items that increase reliability in the
general population may have negligible effects on the reliability of test scores
in actual applicant populations.
Selective increases in reliability in the group with lower mean ability
could also be envisioned to decrease the problem in question, at least insofar
as the differences in sensitivity and positive predictive value are concerned.
An advantage of this solution is that it allows for an analytic evaluation: for
sensitivity and positive predictive value the transformation σ → ασ is
equivalent to transformation (17). However, implementing this solution would
involve the use of longer tests for the group with lower mean ability. Such a
procedure has two obvious drawbacks. First, although it will decrease
differences in sensitivity and positive predictive value, it will simultaneously
increase differences in specificity and negative predictive value. Second, the
procedure would involve differential treatment of the members of each
population, which may be perceived as discriminatory; also, the cutoff scores
would be different since they are defined on different sets of items.
Local increases in reliability would be effective in diminishing the
problem and would not share the drawbacks of the first two options. Because,
with respect to selection invariance, the most important region of θ is the
region around the cutoff, selection procedures could be tailored to be more
reliable in that region. Classical approaches to reliability are not suitable for
achieving this goal because they are population dependent, but Item Response
Theory (IRT) approaches are. IRT models evaluate measurement precision as
a continuous function of the latent dimension known as the test information
function (see Mellenbergh, 1996, for a discussion of the difference between
conceptualizations of measurement precision in classical and modern test
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theory). The form of the test information function can be influenced by
administering different items.
In the present situation, measurement precision could be targeted at the
value of θ that is estimated to be the cutoff score (i.e., the value that produces
the right selection ratio). This could be done by administering extra items
with difficulty parameters close to that point on the latent scale. Such extra
items could be administered, for instance, when the available test scores
indicate that the tested person is located in the relevant region of the latent
dimension. It is perhaps useful to note that such a procedure is not the same
as that followed in widely used adaptive testing programs; these programs
increase measurement precision at the location of a person’s estimated latent
ability, whereas what would be needed here is a procedure that increases
measurement precision at a fixed point of the latent scale. This point is
defined by the selection ratio the selecting institution entertains, together with
the mean and variance of the ability distribution in the applicant population,
and hence will differ across institutions.
Insert Figure 6 about here
A selective improvement of reliability along these lines would result in a
joint distribution of test and ability scores that is ‘squeezed’ in the region
around the cutoff. The joint distribution would therefore look like the one
represented in Figure 6. This would not counter selection bias entirely but
would decrease the difference in incorrect decision across groups, while it
retains the property of measurement invariance: the conditional distribution
of the test score, given θ, would still be identical across groups. Also, it would
not require differential treatment of members of different populations;
members of both groups are administered extra items if they score in the
relevant region. Finally, because different items could be administered by
institutions that employ different selection ratios and deal with applicant
populations centered at different positions of the latent scale, the procedure
can be efficiently tailored to particular selection situations.
Future work
Although the present paper has outlined some of the most important
aspects of the relation between measurement invariance and selection
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invariance, several questions that are beyond the scope of this paper may be
addressed in future research.
First, we have assumed multivariate normality throughout this paper,
but in most selection procedures this assumption will be approximately true
at best. One reason for this is that test scores are usually bounded; hence the
relation between the expected test score and the latent variable will be
nonlinear, and the joint distribution of ability and test scores will not be
multivariate normal. The influence of nonlinearity and non-normality on
selection properties thus requires attention.
Second, we have restricted ourselves to a scenario where selection is
based on a single test score. In reality, however, selection usually takes place
on more than one variable. Hence the problem becomes multidimensional. It
could be the case that incorporating sets of variables in the selection process
decreases the violations of selection invariance discussed in this paper. This
could happen if group differences are reversed on different variables, so that
the group which is located at the low end of one variable is located at the high
end of another. In cases where group differences are in the same direction on
different variables, however, the problems could be expected to be aggravated;
the same holds for situations where some of the additional measures used are
less reliable. Investigating the mechanisms of multidimensional selection may
thus be fruitful, although we expect that analytic approaches will quickly
become mathematically forbidding. In such cases, simulation studies may be
used to shed some light on this issue.
Third, the viability and effect of incorporating local improvements in
measurement precision, which was suggested as a possible methodological
solution to the problem of selection bias, can be studied from an IRT
perspective. One important question is how many additional items one would
need to establish a reasonable approximation to selection invariance. The
answer to this question will probably differ according to the selection situation
considered, and hence may be best addressed in particular selection contexts
with known psychometric qualities.
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Appendix A
Failure of selection invariance
We first prove Equation (5). Because of equation (3) we have








f0,σg (X)dX = N0,σg (agθ), (25)
where fm,s and Nm,s refer to the Gaussian density and the normal
distribution with mean m and standard deviation s respectively. The
requirement that over all values of θ, p(A|θ ∩ g) is the same for each value of
G thus comes down to the requirement that N0,σg (agθ) is the same for each
value of G, which is true by assumption, since ag and σg are constant.
Using expression (25), we can write out the numerator and the









the sole difference between numerator and denominator being the integration
boundaries. Note that, because of the assumption of measurement invariance,
the parameters a and σ do not carry an index g. Only µg varies over the
groups.
Unfortunately there is no analytic solution for the quotient of the above
integrals. Nevertheless we may study p(S|A ∩ g) as a function of the
parameter µg. Specifically, we can differentiate this function with respect to
µg and prove that
d
dµg
[p(S|A ∩ g)] > 0. (28)
This means that of two groups L and H, if µL < µH , the probability of
suitability given acceptance is strictly larger for H than for V . In other words,
the procedure is then not selection invariant due to an inequality of positive
predictive value.














Since the denominator of this expression is always positive, we are only
required to show that
p(A|g) d
dµg
[p(S ∩A|g)]− p(S ∩A|g) d
dµg
[p(A|g)] > 0 (30)





The remainder of the derivation focuses on this inequality.
To arrive at inequality (28), note first that we may apply the
differentiation operation within the integral expressions. From the functional
form of the normal density,













Applying this to the terms in the inequality (31), eliminating the factor 1/σ
on either side, we obtain∫∞




−∞(θ − µg) fNdθ∫∞
−∞ fNdθ
, (34)
where we have written fN to abbreviate fµg ,σ(θ)N0,σ(aθ). The integration
variable θ can now be substituted with θ′ = θ − µg. On the left side of the
inequality, this entails a shift in the integration boundary.













Interestingly, this is the same as an inequality of expectation values for θ′
under the distribution fN :
E[µg ,∞)[θ
′] > E(−∞,∞)[θ′]. (36)
But this inequality is evident: the expectation value of θ′ over the interval
[µg,∞) is always strictly larger than the expectation value of θ′ over the
interval (−∞,∞), if only there is some probability mass in the domain
(−∞, µg). And this is in fact the case for the function fN .
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Appendix B
Symmetry of problem with respect to X and θ
The selection problem is essentially characterized by a normal
distribution of a group over the ability parameter θ and a linear dependence
linking the ability θ to normal distributions over a test score X. We will show
that the very same problem is characterized by a normal distribution of a
group over the scores X, and a linear dependence linking scores X to normal
distributions over ability θ.
First, consider the test as a linear dependence linking ability to normal
distributions over a test score. It is captured completely by a single function
ptest over θ and X, referring to the event of a person with ability θ receiving a
test score X. Note that ptest differs from the full probability assignment p by
the fact that we have not fixed a marginal probability over θ. Now we may
reformulate the function as follows,
ptest(X, θ) = faθ,σ(X)













The point of this reformulation is that we can describe the very same function
defining the test by looking at normal distributions over X given θ and by
looking at normal distributions over θ given X. The test may just as well be
characterized by a linear dependence linking scores X to normal distributions
over ability θ as by the converse dependence.
Now assume the normal distribution of a group G over abilities θ,
fµG,σ(θ) as the marginal probability over θ. The full probability of the event
of a member of group G with ability θ receiving a test score X can now be
written as the product of this marginal and the above function:
p(θ,X) = fµg ,σ(θ)faθ,σ(X). (38)
To establish the symmetry of the selection problem with respect to X and θ,
we must show that under the assumption of a certain test ptest, the marginal
distribution with respect to X is again the normal, and that a difference of
means in ability, µL < µH , translates to a difference of means in test scores,
mL < mH , while the standard deviations are again equal, sL = sH .
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This requires us to compute the functional form of the marginal




















































































(X ′ − γθ′)2
]
dθ′ (41)



























































We can now substitute once again, θ′′ = (1 + γ2)1/2)θ′ − γ
(1+γ2)1/2
X ′ and
integrate out θ′′. Note that X ′ may here be treated as constant.
The functional form of the marginal distribution has now been























The distribution over test scores comes out normally distributed with a mean







with γ = aσσ . The order in the means of the two groups L and H is preserved:
if for the means over the abilities we have µL < µH , then also we have
mL < mH for the means over the test scores. Moreover, since σ, σ and a are





We first establish the observation expressed in equations (18) and (19).
After the combined transformations (16) and (17), the probability over X and
θ can be written as






















The scale transformation thus leaves the probability assignment over X and θ
invariant. Intergrals such as the probabilities of suitability given acceptance
and acceptance given suitability are therefore left invariant under the
transformations as well.
We now establish the observation concerning stand-alone scale
transformations of the regression parameter, as expressed in Equation (19).
We first deal with the probability of acceptance given suitability, p(A|S ∩ g).















where Nµ,σ is again the normal distribution. This integral does not depend on
a. Recall also that













The probability of acceptance given suitability, p(A|S ∩ gµ,σ), is the quotient
of these two expressions, as given in equation (12).
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Consider the probability of passing given suitability for the transformed
regession parameter aα . We can write
p a
α






































Since the normal distribution N0,σ is a monotonically increasing function, the
latter integral is strictly positive if aαθ > aθ. And because in the above
integral the domain is θ ≥ 0, this condition is equivalent to α < 1. Therefore,
α < 1 ⇒ p a
α
(A ∩ S|gµ,σ) > pa(A ∩ S|gµ,σ). (48)
Because the denominator in the quotient of equation (12), as expressed in
equation (45), does not depend on a, the above comes down to (19) for the
probability of acceptance given suitability.
It is now easy to deal with the probability of suitability given









With some algebra, using the fact that p(A|g) = p(A ∩ S|g) + p(A ∩ ¬S|g),
this is equivalent to
p a
α
(A ∩ S|gµ,σ)pa(A ∩ ¬S|gµ,σ) > pa(A ∩ S|gµ,σ)p a
α
(A ∩ ¬S|gµ,σ). (50)
But because of equation (48), this holds if we have
pa(A ∩ ¬S|gµ,σ) ≥ p a
α
(A ∩ ¬S|gµ,σ). (51)
Writing integral expressions for these probabilities in much the same way as in
(47), we find











































1An intuitive way for the reader to see this is to try and draw a picture
like Figure 2, where the bivariate distributions (ellipses) lie on the same
regression line (measurement invariance) and the probability of suitability
given acceptance (roughly, the ratio of the surface of the part of the ellipse,
that lies in the top right quadrant, to the surface of the part, that lies above
the line X = Xc) is also the same (selection invariance); the reader will find
that this ratio always comes out greater for group H.
2To see the exact reach of this result, consider the conditions σ′ < σ and
σ′
σ µ > µ
′. The condition σ′ < σ can be fulfilled without loss of generality. For
the condition σ
′
σ µ > µ
′, it is useful to distinguish between cases in which
µ > µ′ and cases in which µ < µ′. In the case µ > µ′, the condition is met





In the case µ < µ′, however, the condition is met only if µ′ and µ lie far





3Note that the word ‘proportionally’ is very important here; the
conclusion does not apply to absolute numbers of candidates, but only to their
number relative to the entire number of candidates within a group. If the size
of the groups is different, there may be more candidates from the larger group
in every region of the selection space.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The selection problem. The figure shows the distribution of
candidates on the selection variable X as a function of the latent ability θ.
Figure 2. Selection in two groups H and L under measurement invariance.
Figure 3. Error distributions for points close to and far from the cutoff score.
The probability of selection errors decreases as the distance from the cutoff
increases.
Figure 4. Differences in positive predictive value and sensitivity between
groups. For different values of the selection ratio (top to bottom), the left
panel shows positive predictive value and the right panel sensitivity for a low
(L) and high (H) scoring group, as a function of reliability.
Figure 5. Differences in negative predictive value and specificity between
groups. For different values of the selection ratio (top to bottom), the left
panel shows negative predictive value and the right panel specificity for a low
(L) and high (H) scoring group, as a function of reliability.
Figure 6. Minimization of selection bias by means of selective increases in
reliability. Adaptive testing may be used to create an increase in reliability in
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